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EVIDENCE - OFFERS OF COMPROMISE IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 
 
Summary 
The Court considered, on appeal, whether a court can admit evidence of compromise 
offers within real estate transactions for the purpose of demonstrating a failure to mitigate 
damages. Further, it considered whether real estate licensees are shielded from all forms of 
common law liability. Lastly, the Court considered whether compensatory damages should 
include diminution-in-value for a claim alleging fraud, whether carrying costs as consequential 
damages should be limited by the economic loss doctrine, and whether the district court erred in 
denying attorney’s fees provided for in listing and purchase agreements to the prevailing party. 
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Court concluded that evidence of offers of compromise is not admissible to 
demonstrate a failure to mitigate damages. It also found that NRS 645.251 only protects a real 
estate licensee from liability due to conduct relating to NRS 645.252-645.254.  The Court also 
held that compensatory damages for fraud claims include carrying costs and diminution-in-value, 
and are not barred by the economic loss doctrine. Lastly, the Court found that the prevailing 
party was entitled to attorney’s fees per their listing and purchase agreements. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 The issue before the Court arose from complications with a couple’s desire to use the 
proceeds from the sale of their home (“Augusta Property”) to finance the acquisition of a new 
custom-built home (“MacDonald Highlands Property”).  Kristen Beling and William Dougherty, 
Jr. (“The Doughertys”) entered into contracts with Cheryl Davis (“Davis”) as their listing agent 
and Platinum Properties GMAC Real Estate (“Platinum”) as their broker for the sale of their 
current home. 
The Doughertys agreed to sell the Augusta Property to Chris and Tracy Byrd (“The 
Byrds”) who provided an earnest deposit and prepared to close in a few months.  After Davis 
assured the Doughertys that the Byrds were going to close on the Augusta Property, the 
Doughertys closed on the MacDonald Highlands Property. Davis recommended that the 
Dougherty buy, rather than rent, an interim home since they needed a place to live for the 
estimated two-year construction period of the MacDonald Highlands Property, so the Doughertys 
entered an agreement to purchase a home (“Ping Property”) with the intent to sell it after moving 
into the MacDonald Highlands Property.  
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Closing on the Ping Property, however, was meant to be contingent on the closing of the 
Augusta Property because the Doughertys needed the funds from the sale to pay for the closing.  
However, Davis did not honor the Doughertys’ request and failed to make this offer contingent.  
Furthermore, despite Davis’ repeated assertions to the contrary, the Byrds were unable to 
successfully close on the Augusta Property.   
Davis soon informed the Doughertys that they needed to close escrow on the Ping 
Property or lose their earnest money deposit. The Doughertys did not want to close on the Ping 
Property because the Augusta Property had not closed. Davis then, pretending to act on behalf of 
the Byrds, gave the Doughertys $150,000 to close on the Ping Property and told them the 
Augusta Property would close in a few days. The Byrds were never able to successfully close on 
the Augusta Property.  Davis then offered to purchase the Ping Property from the Doughertys, 
but the Doughertys refused. 
Davis sued under multiple theories to recover the $150,000 advanced to the Doughertys, 
and the Doughertys countersued for multiple causes of action including negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud by misrepresentation and concealment, breach of fiduciary duty, a claim 
under NRS 645.257 for a real estate licensee’s breach of duties imposed by NRS 645/252-
645.254, and sued Platinum based on a respondeat superior theory.   
 After the court scheduled a jury trial, the district court granted the Dougherty’s motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of Davis’ oral offer to buy the Ping Property.  The district court also 
granted Davis’ motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to the Doughertys’ carrying costs 
for the Ping Property arguing that they should only recover their out-of-pocket damages and that 
carrying costs are barred by the economic loss doctrine. The jury’s verdict awarded Davis for 
unjust enrichment, and the Doughertys for compensatory and punitive damages for their fraud-
by-concealment claim and statutory damages for their NRS 645.257 claim. The jury also 
awarded the Doughertys compensatory and punitive damages for their 645.257 claims against 
Platinum. The court later granted the Doughertys’ post-judgment motion for attorney’s fees 
under the offer of judgment rule, but denied their request for attorney fees under the listing and 
purchase agreements. Both parties appealed challenging various aspects of the district court’s 
decisions.  
Discussion 
Justice Saitta wrote for the unanimous three-judge panel. The Court first noted that under 
the plain meaning of NRS 48.105(1),
2
 parties cannot introduce evidence of offers of compromise 
when such evidence is used to prove the amount of damages or liability, but under NRS 
48.105(2),
3
 the evidence is allowable if used for a different purpose.  Even though a failure to 
mitigate damages is technically a different purpose, the Court found that introducing evidence of 
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 NEV. REV. STAT. 48.105 (1) (2007).    
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 NEV. REV. STAT. 48.105 (2) (2007).    
Davis’ offer to pay the Doughertys $150,000 to close on the Ping Property inescapably goes to 
the amount of damages. Because this is clearly prohibited by statute, the Court affirmed the 
district court’s decision to exclude this evidence. 
The Court also found that NRS 645.251
4
 alters traditional forms of common law liability 
for real estate licensees because it expressly limits their duties of care and disclosure to the 
provisions in NRS 645.252-NRS 645.254.
5
  Therefore, the district court erred in entering 
judgment against Davis on  Doughertys’ fraud-by-concealment claim because this claim directly 
overlapped with the conduct mentioned in the statute. Analogously, since the Dougherty’s claim 
of respondeat superior liability against Platinum was not covered in these special provisions, the 
Court affirmed the district court’s judgment against Platinum. 
 On the issue of damages, the Court found that the actual damages under 645.257
6
 
corresponded with the common understanding of compensatory damages, which included 
diminution damages and consequential damages. The Court found that the district court 
appropriately computed Doughertys’ compensatory damages by comparing Davis’ conduct to the 
agent in Strebel, who fraudulently induced a homeowner to sell his home.
7
  The current case was 
similar to Strebel because the Court found a substantial relationship between the Doughertys’ 
and the Strebel homeowner’s lost appreciation damages as well as Davis’ and the agent’s 
fraudulent conduct. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision on the appropriate 
measure of compensatory damages. 
 The Court also found that the district court should have allowed the Doughertys’ to 
recover carrying costs of the Ping property as consequential damages because the Doughertys’ 
reasonably incurred the costs to minimize the effects of Davis’ fraudulent conduct. Had they not 
paid the taxes, mortgage, and maintenance costs on the property, a court would have accurately 
deemed them as failing to mitigate their damages. Furthermore, the Court found that the 
economic loss doctrine does not apply to intentional breaches of obligations required by law 
where the beach of that duty caused a purely economic loss to the plaintiff.  Therefore, the Court 
reversed the district court’s decision to preclude the Doughertys’ recovery of their carrying costs. 
 Lastly, the Court found that the clear and unambiguous language of the contracts between 
the parties for the listing agreement of the Augusta Property and the purchase agreements for the 
Augusta and Ping Properties provided that the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys fees for 
actions arising out of enforcement of the agreement. Therefore, the Court ruled that the district 
court erred in denying the Dougherty’s’ motion for attorney’s fees per the agreements. 
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 Conclusion 
 Evidence of offers of compromise is not admissible to demonstrate a failure to mitigate 
damages.  Even though NRS 645.251 only protects a real estate licensee from liability of conduct 
covered in NRS 645.252-645.254, it does not shield a real estate licensee from other forms of 
common law liability not included in those statutory provisions.  Additionally, compensatory 
damages, including carrying costs and diminution-in-value, are not barred by the economic loss 
doctrine in an intentional breach of fiduciary duties. Lastly, when the clear and unambiguous 
language of a contract calls for attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in enforcement actions, 
courts should honor such provisions. 
